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The Iraqi writer Sinan Antoon mused that in the eyes of the world the Middle East had 
become ‘a place where the burden of the past weighed so heavily and the cultural DNA 
somehow preconditioned those who carried it to feel more at home with tyrants and terror’ 
(Antoon 2012, 7). Starting in Tunisia on 17 December 2010 and from 25 January 2011 
followed by the ‘18 Days’, 18 days of mass protests in regional heavyweight Egypt, the Arab 
uprisings reinvigorated popular street politics throughout the Middle East and the world at 
large. The colorful occupation of Midan Tahrir (Tahrir Square) by tens of thousands of 
ordinary Egyptians became the heart and soul of the uprisings – and beyond, as movements 
such as Occupy Wall Street, the Spanish Indignados, and the Turkish Gezi protesters were 
inspired by the occupation of the Square (Bogaert 2011). Tahrir was a geographic and 
political node of Cairo, and in turn of the whole of Egypt, as it represented: ‘a major transport 
hub surrounded by vital elements of the state apparatus: the parliament, several ministerial 
buildings, and the imposing Mugamma‘ii’  (Rashed 2011, 23). Additionally, its name, 
‘Liberation Square’ referred to the 1919 revolutionary uprising against the British. By 2011 it 
had become a favorite gathering place for national events. As Ahmed Shokr notes, ‘Egyptians 
have poured into Tahrir to celebrate soccer victories, to mourn the passing of national icons, 
and to protest injustice’ (Shokr 2012, 41). In 2003 Tahrir had already become the symbolic 
locale of political mobilization, when demonstrators occupied the Square for ten hours in 
protest against the war in Iraq (Khalil 2012, 39). 
 The uprisings took most scholars and observers of the region by surprise. Within the 
domain of Middle East Studies the dominant research paradigm that framed the region’s 
populations as passive objects of religion, tradition, and authoritarianism (Beinin and Vairel 
2011, 1; Seikaly in Seikaly et al. 2015) was increasingly criticized. However, the Arab 
uprisings and the episode of Tahrir more specifically do not only teach us something about the 
nature of politics in Egypt or the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, but 
also about processes of mass agency, popular sovereignty, and societal transformation 
relevant to contemporary global society in general. Rather than finally ‘catching up’ with the 
West in a belated ‘third wave of democracy’ (Huntington 1991), the Arab uprisings are but 
the newest episode in an ongoing popular struggle from below, becoming themselves the 
catalyst of new forms of protest and resistance in the West. Furthermore, the renewed concept 
of ‘the people’ may offer a way to overcome the discursive and organizational limits of 
identity and alterglobalization politics in challenging and overcoming relations of exploitation 
and domination (see Gerbaudo 2014). Conversely, recent developments in Egypt demonstrate 
what happens with emancipatory projects when popular subjectivities are instrumentalised by 
authoritarian forces. 
 I have been following social and political movements in Egypt since 2008, drawing on 
qualitative research methods such as interviews, informal conversations, and (participatory) 
observation of group meetings and protest actions to understand the formation and 
development of collective agency within a theoretical framework that is informed by the 
political theory of Antonio Gramsci (1860-1937) and the cultural psychology of Lev 
Vygotsky (1896-1934). I comprehended struggle in terms of a collective learning process that 
entailed the formation of a coherent social body, comprised of new ideas, goals, signs, 
relations, artifacts, and practices: i.e., a subject, as I explain further below.  
 In this chapter I tackle the more philosophical issue of the category of ‘the people’, which 
has been designated as the main actor of the Arab uprisings. Where did this agent come from? 
Did it spring from existing identities of resistance? How can such a sociologically diverse 
group be represented as a singular force? In order to answer these questions I advance a 
constructivist understanding of the people as a historical process of subject formation. In 
order to transcend methodological individualism and collectivism I suggest ‘individual’ and 
‘collective’ as modes of the subject, whereas its substance is human activity. This leads to the 
insight that ‘the people’ is not merely an aggregate of existing subjectivities – the will of all – 
but a subject in its own right – the general will – a sum that is bigger than its constituent parts. 
The practical, semiotic, and institutional participation in the project of ‘the people’ – a 
popular subjectivity – is articulated within the individual person and becomes a composite 
part of his or her ‘identity’. 
 Subsequently I briefly discuss how in Egypt the formation of a general will – the principle 
of popular sovereignty – has been historically disconnected from its real constituent body – 
the popular masses – through external representation. Popular protest and revolution are 
posited as activities that ground the principle of popular sovereignty (back) into its material 
body by means of self-representation. I finish with a discussion of the 25 January uprising and 
the subsequent process of revolution and counter-revolution in Egypt, which functions as a 
case study of popular subject formation ‘from below’ and of its appropriation and deflection 
by authoritarian forces ‘from above’. 
 
 
In Want of the People 
 
When the Egyptian demonstrations on 25 January 2011, planned by small groups of political, 
human rights, and social media activists
iii
, turned into mass protests, their dominant slogan 
became al- sha‘b  yurid isqat al-nizam (the people want the fall of the regime), which was ‘a 
direct import from Tunisia’ (Khalil 2012, 144). During the Tunisian uprising, this demand 
was chanted at the Avenue Habib Bourguiba until President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali stepped 
down. The phrase ‘the people want’ referred to a popular poem by the Tunisian poet Abu al-
Qasim al-Shabbi (1909-34), of which the final two lines had been incorporated in the national 
anthem: ‘If the people want life someday, fate will surely grant their wish. Their shackles will 
surely be shattered and their night surely vanish’ (Achcar 2013, 13). In Tunisia and Egypt 
protesters presented themselves as ‘the people’ wanting the fall of ‘the regime’. This powerful 
slogan implied the existence of a collective political actor expressing a national sovereign will 
and pushing those social elements belonging to ‘the regime’ outside of popular legitimacy. 
Either you were with al-sha‘b (the people) or with al-nizam (the regime”). 
 The 25 January protests were joined by young and old people, men and women, workers 
and businessmen, Christians and Muslims, which reinforced the ‘national’ character of the 
movement in the streets (Bamyeh 2011). However, it also revealed the sociological diversity 
represented by the universalist signifier of ‘the people’ – a heterogeneous gathering of 
individuals from different social, political, economic, and cultural backgrounds and from 
distinct age, sex, and belief groups. Furthermore, ‘the people’ was far from being a stable 
category during the development of the uprising: its numbers increased and decreased with 
the ebb and flow of the mobilisations; and the allegiance of individuals and groups shifted 
sometimes from participating in the protests to supporting Mubarak and vice versa. In 
contradistinction to the relatively small ‘hard core’ of a few thousands of protesters whose 
revolutionary activity was incessant and relentless, the real mass base of hundreds of 
thousands of demonstrators was constantly in flux. While there was a mass popular 
contestation of the regime, the population was not consistently and continuously united 
against the dictator. The state was able to mobilize substantial social reserves, especially, but 
not exclusively, members of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP) and baltagiyya, the 
regime’s semi-criminal plainclothes police forces. In addition, layers of the population either 
stayed at home, remaining politically passive or afraid of societal chaos; actively supported 
the president in the streets; or believed the government’s willingness to implement reforms. 
This group expanded and contracted throughout the 18 Days of the uprising. The violent 
intervention of pro-Mubarak supporters, for example during the infamous ‘Battle of the 
Camel’ on Wednesday 2 February, undermined the regime’s credibility and legitimacy, 
convincing new layers to participate in the protests or to ‘switch sides’ (Schielke 2011).  
 The diversity and fluidity of the protesting body of the 25 January uprising demonstrate 
that there was no protagonist simply waiting behind the curtains of history only to make its 
scripted appearance at the scene of revolution. ‘The people’ do not coincide with ‘the 
population’, which merely represents the passive collection of individuals in a given society. 
And so, in the face of hundreds of thousands of protesters chanting ‘the people want the fall 
of the regime’, we may arrive at an almost surreal ontological suspicion: do ‘the people’ as a 
collective actor even exist? Indeed, Salwa Ismail observed that: 
 
The revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia invite us to consider the question of the relationship 
between subjectivities, on one hand, and political agency and collective action, on the 
other. In both revolutions the people formed as a collective agent asserting a collective will 
and putting forward demands for radical transformation. The people, as a collective actor, 
engaged in sustained protests, formulated unified demands, and developed a shared 
discourse that affirmed the will to bring about specific changes (Ismail 2011, 990). 
 
Here, Ismail highlights that ‘the people’ is not an a priori category, but the result of the 
formation of collective agency. The slogan of ‘the people want’ indicates a transformation of 
a passive ‘population’ into an active ‘people’. Thus the question whether the people ‘exists’, 
shifts from an epistemological perspective – is ‘the people’ a true or false representation of 
the agent at Tahrir Square – to an ontological one: how do ‘people’ become ‘the people’. 
From this perspective, popular revolution is not only the product of the activity of certain 
actors, it is a productive process in its own right, in which new political subjects emerge, or 
existing actors are transformed in fundamental ways. 
  
 
Subject: Individual and Collective 
 
In modern society the dominant conception of the subject is the individual person. From a 
legal perspective, in most countries, being part of the human species is not a sufficient 
condition to qualify for subjectness – the capacity to act as a subject. However, the human 
body itself is not a subject. For example, age and mental health are additional parameters that 
distinguish those members of society who are responsible for their own acts from those that 
are not. The philosopher of language Valentin Voloshinov (1895-1936) underlined that:  
 
To avoid misunderstandings, a rigorous distinction must always be made between the 
concept of the individual as natural specimen without reference to the social world … and 
the concept of individuality which has the status of an ideological-semiotic superstructure 
over the natural individual and which, therefore, is a social concept (Voloshinov 1973, 34).  
 
The notion of the individual person is a modern form of individuality. Modern individuality is 
that which in the social sciences is commonly referred to as ‘identity’: the conscious 
recognition of one’s own composite individuality that is the result of one’s participation in 
diverse cultural systems. In order to be responsible for her own deeds, the modern individual 
subject has to be a knowing and moral actor able to reflect rationally on her own nature and to 
direct her actions self-consciously according to this cognitive and ethical process.  
 In the European Middle Ages the term ‘subjectum’ was traditionally reserved for 
individuals that were subjected to the power of a sovereign. Subjects formed the passive 
substance of a monarch’s active power. In the seventeenth century, the French rationalist 
philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650) coined the term subject as the individual cognizing 
actor, consolidating the humanist conception developed during the Renaissance of the 
individual philosopher, scientist, and thinker as the active and creative constructor of 
knowledge. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) granted the subject its full 
modern content of unity between individual morality, cognition, and self-consciousness. Kant 
recognized that all knowledge was derived from experience, but that experience itself was 
only possible through the existence of transcendental categories that preceded experience, e.g. 
quality and quantity, identity and difference, time and space. This form of a priori 
transcendental cognition belonged to the transcendental subject, which was a purely abstract 
and universal subject – i.e. that which remained of the individual cognizing actor after its 
consciousness had been purged of particular cultural-historical categories. Kant’s individual, 
knowing subject was the unity of a phenomenal and noumenal (or transcendental) subject, 
respectively operating in the realm of sensual understanding and of transcendental reason. 
Apart from a rational observer, the individual human subject was by definition a moral actor, 
a person who carried responsibility for her own acts. For Kant, this morality was not a 
cultural-historical construct, but it belonged to the domain of the transcendental subject: 
‘conscience is not a thing to be acquired, and it is not a duty to acquire it; but every man, as a 
moral being, has it originally within him’ (Kant 2008, 105). Similar to cognition, morality 
was a human universal that preceded the particular teachings of any secular or religious 
tradition. That which was right in general could not be deduced empirically, but had to be 
derived logically, free from contingent factors or cultural-historical preferences. The basic 
logical axiom or categorical imperative was the Principle of Universalizability: ‘Act 
according to a maxim which can be adopted at the same time as a universal law’ (Kant 2008, 
78). In other words, if an act can be universalised without it leading to logical contradictions, 
it is a moral act. Kant’s modern conception of moral agency refers to duty not as an external 
bond between the individual and a higher power, but as a relation internal to the subject: 
between its free will and the universal categorical imperative. Interior, individual self-
discipline instead of exterior, social force emerged as the instrumentality of moral duty. 
 The German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) rejected Kant’s concept of a 
transcendental subject, which suggested a schizophrenic cognizing subject, whose 
transcendental categories were completely disconnected from contemplation of the 
conceivable world of objects. Instead Fichte took human activity as the substance of his 
philosophy. Through activity the separate worlds of the thinking subject and the contemplated 
object could encounter one another and form relations of correspondence: 
 
If philosophy begins with a fact, then it places itself in the midst of a world of being and 
finitude, and it will be difficult indeed for it to discover any path leading from this world to 
an infinite and supersensible one. If, however, philosophy begins with an Act, then it finds 
itself as the precise point where these two worlds are connected with each other and from 
which they can both be surveyed in a single glance (Fichte 1994, 51). 
 
The thinking subject and the object of thought are not a priori categories, but they emerge 
from the primordial substance of activity. Notwithstanding the peculiarities and problems of 
Fichte’s system, the radical thinker played a crucial role in the development of a philosophy 
of the subject by positing that the subject is something that is constructed from human 
activity. Consequently, the study of the subject becomes an investigation of activities and how 
they bring forth forms of agency, cognition, and morality.  
 Fichte still took for granted that the subject was first and foremost an individual human 
being and that ‘society’ or ‘culture’ somehow could be derived from this singular unit of life. 
However, the concept of the subject as an individual person exists side by side with other 
notions of human agency. In common discourse broad categories such as class, race, and 
gender, and institutions such as the family, school, company, state, and market are endowed 
with the power to act. Most legal systems recognise institutional agents by differentiating 
between natural and juridical persons. Whereas natural persons are individuals, juridical 
persons are entities that are treated as persons before the law. This practice reveals that a 
subject can be something else than an individual, and, in fact, that its prevalence often 
necessitates an explicit recognition by law. Conversely, it discloses that the conception of the 
subject as an individual human being has become so self-evident that in order to be 
recognised as a subject and to be able to function in society, a non-individual agent has to be 
subsumed under the category of ‘person’.  
 In her investigation of the 25 January 2011 movement Ismail posited that ‘we need to 
consider the individual selves that formed the collective … a process through which 
intersubjective understandings of individual experiences become constitutive of a social 
imaginary and translate into shared sentiments and agreed ideas and aspirations’ (Ismail 2011, 
990). Ismail presumed that the collective nature of ‘the people’ constructed at Tahrir could be 
understood through an analysis of its constituent parts – the individual selves – which 
preceded the whole. However, taking individual identities as the building blocks of collective 
subjects is problematic, as persons are as much the effect as the cause of collective subjects. 
Gramsci underlined that: 
 
one must conceive of man [sic] as a series of active relationships (a process) in which 
individuality, though perhaps the most important, is not, however, the only element to be 
taken into account. … The individual does not enter into relations with other men by 
juxtaposition, but organically, in as much, that is, as he belongs to organic entities which 
range from the simplest to the most complex (Gramsci 1971, 352). 
 
Obviously, a human being is not born as a fully-formed person, but is the product of his 
participation in diverse ‘organic entities’ such as family, school, friends, workplace, and the 
communities in which he matures. It is impossible to think of ourselves as a person isolated 
from these units of social life that have produced our ‘individuality’ and through which we 
continue to reproduce ourselves as a person. Individual and collective subjects presuppose one 
another logically and historically. 
 However, the categories of ‘individual’ and ‘collective’ do not inform us of what a subject 
is made of. The flesh and bones of the individual person are not that which grants her the 
capacity to act. Individual and collective designate modes of the subject, not its substance. 
The Soviet philosopher Evald Ilyenkov (1924-79) commented that:  
 
The separate individual is only human in the exact and strict sense of the word, insofar as 
he actualizes – and just by his individuality – some ensemble or other of historically 
developed faculties (specifically human forms of life activity), some fragment or other of a 
culture formed before and independently of him, and mastered by him during upbringing 
(the moulding of the person). From that angle the human personality can rightly be 
considered as an individual embodiment of culture, i.e. of the universal in man (Ilyenkov 
2008a, 359). 
 
A subjectivity – the content of any subject – consists of various practices, semiotic systems, 
and material artifacts – i.e. cultural-historical forms of human activity, in the sense of both  
‘the freely conscious creativity of the subject and the whole vast sphere of the “dead”, 
congealed, fossilized creative activity, the world of objects’ (Ilyenkov 2008a, 154). In 
methodological terms the singular person is a sediment of the specific collective subjects in 
which she participates and has participated. However, the subject matter of her individual life 
trajectory should not be confused with the subjectivities of the organic entities to which she 
belongs (or has belonged). The collective subject has a life process in its own right, a 
development as a distinct whole, which cannot be reduced to the path of a singular participant 
or represented as the simple aggregate of the discrete life stories of all partakers. A 
sociological analysis of which individuals and groups participated in the occupation of Tahrir 
does not directly enhance our understanding of how these disparate elements function 
together as a whole. The parts obviously make up the whole, but they do not constitute it, 
instead their own function, position, meaning, or role is constituted by the whole. Throughout 
the 25 January uprising the activities of men, women, Muslims, Copts, youth, workers, 
shopkeepers, and so on, were determined and rendered meaningful by their continuous 
reference to ‘the people’. 
 The French philosopher Jean-Jacque Rousseau (1712-1778) distinguished between the 
volonté de tous (the will of everyone) and the volonté générale (the general will). Whereas the 
volonté de tous expressed a shared attribute of otherwise atomized citizens, the volonté 
générale referred to the people as a whole political subject. The subjectness that emerged 
from the collaboration of protesters in the streets was not a mere addition of distinct wills, but 
the formation of a general will, expressed in the slogan of ‘the people want’. In this regard, 
the activity of the 18 Days reconstructed existing forms of national, popular sovereignty ‘from 
below’. 
 
The People: Principle and Body 
 
Obviously the concept of ‘the people’ as a sovereign power preceded the episode of Tahrir. 
European thinkers and Egyptian nationalist intellectuals introduced the modern notion of the 
people as a political category in the nineteenth century, which gained wider societal traction 
with the mass struggles against colonialism. When Egypt became an independent nation in the 
wake of the 1919 popular revolt against British rule, its 1923 constitution was still proclaimed 
by ‘we, the King of Egypt’. Egyptians remained subjected to the power of the monarch, who 
remained the source of constitutional rights and freedoms. The nationalist coup of the Free 
Officers abolished the monarchy and the 1956 constitution established ‘we, the people of 
Egypt’ as the sovereign political entity. ‘The people’ gained immediate recognition as a 
collective subject, endowed with a volition of their own and a capacity to act. However, they 
became a subject without subjectivity, a mere concept of subjectness, as they did not have a 
social body of their own that allowed them to act.  
 In order to become a concrete subject instead of an abstract principle, ‘the people’ have to 
generate a material substance for their spectral body. Popular subjectivities have always 
existed side by side with the developing notion of the people as sovereign power. The 
material substance of ‘the popular’ has been present in the sense of vulgar, depoliticized, 
subaltern cultural forms, common sense, folklore, and everyday ways of living. If al-sha‘b is 
a subjectness without subjectivity, sha‘bi (popular) is a subjectivity without subjectness. The 
concept of the uneducated, unsophisticated, and mean sha‘bi sector stands in a relation of 
opposition to the elevated and philosophical principle of the sovereign people. These two 
categories do not appear to have a common ground and even directly exclude one another. 
Colonial rulers, nationalist activists, and leftist intellectuals alike were suspicious of the 
‘rabble’ as a self-determining political force. The abstract principle of popular sovereignty 
was actualized by an external mediation or representation of the people. Thus, ‘the people’ 
were acknowledged as the source of sovereign power, but not as a self-determining agent in 
their own right. This logic of external representation turned popular sovereignty into a passive 
concept, which cast the Egyptian people in the role of children who had to be protected and 
led by educated elites (Seikaly and Ghazaleh 2011; Seikaly et al. 2015). Popular will is 
separated from the popular body and represented/subjugated by alien structures of governance 
such as the post-1919 monarchy and the post-1952 Nasserist state.  
 However, there is also an underground history of popular sovereignty that becomes 
grounded in subaltern culture and, vice versa, the rabble that organizes itself as a political 
force, articulating a general will. The activity of protest becomes the material, common 
ground where the everyday conditions of the sha‘bi sector encounter the principle of popular 
sovereignty. The external opposition between the abstract and the real people becomes an 
internal contradiction within the moment of protest: if the people are, in fact, a sovereign 
power they have rights, but they are demanding these rights of themselves in the shape of a 
state that represents them. This contradiction is contained as long as the demands are 
successfully displaced by the state as particular instead of general goals, defending sectorial 
instead of popular interests. Yet at certain moments “people are being pushed together by an 
external force” (Ghazaleh in Seikaly et al. 2015): the ongoing decentralized and disconnected 
protests, strikes, civil disobedience, and other forms of resistance become concentrated in the 
form of salient and generalized mass movements, uprisings, and rebellions. From this 
perspective, the essence of a popular revolution is ‘the direct interference of the masses in 
historic events’ whereby the masses ‘break over the barriers excluding them from the political 
arena, sweep aside their traditional representatives, and create by their own interference the 
initial groundwork for a new regime’ (Trotsky 2001, 17-18). Thus, as Trotsky argued, ‘The 
history of a revolution is for us first of all a history of the forcible entrance of the masses into 
the realm of rulership over their own destiny’ (Trotsky 2001, 17-18). 
 The material generalization of the activity of protest generates a mass popular body for the 
abstract principle of sovereignty, revealing a new opposition: between the developing 
structures of self-representation of the people and the organs that claim to represent it – 
between al- sha‘b  and al-nizam. Popular protest starts with the notion that ‘its state’ 
misrepresents the ‘general good’, and subsequently develops an understanding that the state 
represents all too correctly the interests of a particular class – a process that positions ‘the 
people’ against an alien state. Moreover, this opposition is also articulated internally, as the 
people-as-subject discover themselves at odds with the sociological population, the object of 
state policies. In order to exercise its general will the people have to create their own 
mediations and exclude dominant classes and groups, moving toward a so-called ‘dictatorship 
of the majority’. 
 Moments such as the 1882 Urabi Revolt,
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 the 1919 Revolution, the anticolonial resistance 
in the years leading up to the Free Officers’ coup of 1952, the 1977 ‘bread riots’, and the 2011 
uprising remind us that  ‘modern Egyptians have never passively accepted the failed colonial 
or postcolonial states that fate has dealt them’ (Colla 2012, 48). Moreover, these instances of 
national-popular subjectness were connected to regional and global processes, such as 
decolonization struggles; new social movements; and, more recently, resistance against 
neoliberal capitalism (De Smet 2016). When movements broke down, traditions of revolt 
were often preserved in popular collective memory in the form of poetry and music, only to 
be rearticulated by new generations in new contexts, alongside novel cultural forms. For 
example, together with modern performances and YouTube collages the classical popular 
songs of Fuad Negm and Shaykh Imam of the 1970s were an integral part of the soundtrack of 
the 2011 uprising (Antoon 2011). Indeed, the contemporary revolts did not wake the region 
from an eternal slumber of Oriental despotism, but the salient display of mass agency on 
Tahrir reintroduced a conception of the popular masses as a collective agent for a new 
generation.  
 
The People Want Change 
 
The 25 January uprising started as a demonstration, a showing of discontent: a clear message 
directed at those in power and a rallying call toward potential supporters. The accumulation of 
anger, criticisms, and resistance since the past years, the example projected by the Tunisian 
revolution, and the organisation of marches from popular neighborhoods allowed activists to 
draw in huge numbers of non-politicized citizens into showing their displeasure with the 
regime. The sudden eruption of popular protests created the impression that ‘Before the 
revolution nothing happens and then during the revolution everything happens all the time’ 
(Zaky 2011), as one activist told me. Yet the activity of the insurrection drew heavily on 
preceding movements and existing cultural frameworks. Social and political movements, 
organizations, networks, and individual actors were able to inject the knowledge and practice 
of revolt that they had acquired during the previous decade into the mass protests (De Smet 
2015a). Moreover, the cheerful atmosphere at Tahrir reflected subaltern traditions such as that 
of the Ultras football supporters, who offered ‘skills in banner writing, chanting, and the use 
of fireworks’ (Keraitim and Mehrez 2012, 53) and religious mulid celebrations. Indeed, as 
Sahar Keraitim and Samia Mehrez note:   
a popular form of carnivalesque festivities that has been celebrated in Egypt for hundreds 
of years and whose rituals, enacted by multitudes of demonstrators, were marshaled, 
politicized, and revolutionized during the massive protests and sit-ins to sustain and 
transform the impetus and impact of the revolt (Keraitim and Mehrez 2012, 30).  
The appearance of elements of the traditional, religious mulid illustrated how the uprising 
rearticulated existing popular subjectivities within a ‘bottom up’ concept of popular 
sovereignty. 
 However, this does not mean that the 18 Days were but a quantitative – bigger and louder – 
continuation of earlier protests and popular subjectivities. As soon as the masses entered the 
political field, the activity of revolt acquired a qualitatively novel and autonomous dynamic. 
The activity of revolution was, at the same time, a revolution of existing popular 
subjectivities. Traditional religious gatherings after the Friday midday prayers organically 
morphed into political mass demonstrations. Friday 28 January became a key moment for the 
revolutionary project when demonstrations turned into a mass popular offensive against the 
hated Central Security Forces (CSF). The first outer defense force of the Mubarak state – the 
police – was utterly defeated in the streets. Protesters conquered social spaces that were 
formerly controlled by the state. This marked the transition from demonstration to occupation 
as the leading activity of the uprising. At this point most protesters began to realise that they 
were in the process of ‘making’ a revolution. Whereas many political activists were still 
cautiously chanting for the government to change, it was non-organised and non-politicised 
people who shouted for an end to the regime. Revolution was not only the materialisation of 
an already-present popular will, but also as a generative process of self-emancipating 
practices and ideas.  
 From Saturday 29 January onward, the release of prisoners and the semi-organised looting, 
violence, and vandalism, constituted a new predicament for the revolutionary masses. The 
intimidation of families and the vandalising of homes meant that the activity of the national-
popular subject was directed from ‘demonstrating in the streets’ to ‘securing 
neighbourhoods’. The state tried to undermine the legitimacy of the uprising by smothering it 
in a wave of orchestrated chaos. However, this obstacle became a springboard for the 
revolutionary movement. In the absence of law and order, popular collaborations established 
grassroots committees to protect families, homes, and neighborhoods. Ironically, often the 
withdrawal of the police reinforced, instead of weakened, the cohesion of local communities. 
For instance as an activist narrated: 
 
you live in a house and you don’t know your neighbours and suddenly you know everyone 
from your street. Not only your own building, but the entire block. You meet people living 
in your own building, living in the building next to you, people living along the whole 
street, you start to get to know people, calling them to see if they are alright, you know. It 
was actually a way for people to get to know each other and it worked pretty good. And I 
think it was actually an awesome display of how people were self-aware of things like 
safety, there was no vandalism, no looting, people protected the library of Alexandria, 
people protected the Egyptian museum (al-Gourd 2011). 
 
Despite the national character of the insurrection, after the defeat of the police on Friday 28 
January, Tahrir became the ‘epicenter of a revolution’ (Khalil 2012, 5). From a mere site to 
demonstrate discontent, the occupation of the Square became an instrument of popular power 
to pressure the president to step down: we won’t leave until you leave. Midan Tahrir was 
slowly transformed into a ‘city of tents’ (Guardian News Blog 6/2, 2011). In order to continue 
the occupation, housing in the form of tents was provided, blankets were distributed to 
overcome the chilly January nights, food and water were made available, and entertainment 
was arranged to keep the spirits of the occupiers high. Tahrir became a ‘freed zone’ within the 
belly of the dictatorship (Rashed 2011, 34). Even though achieving the objective of the 
uprising, the overthrow of the Mubarak regime, remained grim, the liberating feeling among 
Tahrir occupiers that they could organise their own lives independent of al-nizam, allowed for 
a what Vladimir Lenin may refer to as a ‘festival of the oppressed and exploite’” (Lenin 
1962). The occupation of Tahrir generated ways of enjoying life (Rashed 2011), illustrated by  
‘the picnicking families, the raucous flag-wavers, the volunteer tea suppliers, the cheery 
human security cordons, the slumbering bodies curled up in the metal treads of the army's 
tanks, the pro-change graffiti that adorns every placard, every tent, every wall space in vision’  
(Guardian News Blog 8/2b). Many Egyptians experienced a greater authenticity of living, 
negating, albeit in a limited way, the realities of the oppressive nizam: ‘It is not just a protest 
against an oppressive regime and a demand for freedom. In itself, it is freedom. It is a real, 
actual, lived moment of the freedom and dignity that the pro-democracy movement demands’ 
(Schielke 2011). 
 
The People are Change 
 
The activity of occupation was subsequently transformed from an instrument of liberation to a 
prefiguration (see van de Sande 2013) of a free society, as is reflected in Shokr’s observation: 
‘As the revolution unfolded, Tahrir was elevated from a rally site to a model for an alternative 
society’ (Shokr 2012, 42). When protesters arrived at Tahrir on January 29, they did not come 
with the intention of creating a radical utopia. Rather, as Ashraf Khalil notes, ‘Protesters not 
only transformed it, they were themselves transformed by their presence in it. Tahrir became a 
revolutionary organism unto itself’ (Khalil 2012, 5). From this perspective, the spontaneous 
emergence of structures of self-mediation was a popular negation of the logic of external 
representation. Attempts by established political actors to mediate popular subjectivity during 
the 18 Days, for example by the ‘Council of the Wise’, were principally rejected. Even during 
the first days of demonstrations, some protesters no longer chanted ‘we want change’, but ‘we 
are change’ (Guardian News Blog 28/1, 2011). The slogan ‘we want change’ implicitly 
addressed the state, which could achieve change for the masses. This aim expressed popular 
sovereignty – the people as wanting something – but not yet the self-determining agency of 
al- sha‘b. The slogan could still be a part of the old Arab nationalist paradigm, whereby the 
people demanded its rights from the state. ‘We are change’, however, forcefully rejected the 
paternalist mediation of an external force in the emancipation of the people. ‘Change’ was no 
longer an object external to the activity of the people that could be demanded from and 
granted by another power: ‘change’ was the self-directing activity of the masses. The 
realisation that the people organised in the streets was the solution to its own problems is the 
realisation of its political agency as a people: ‘we don't need politicians; this is the people's 
revolution!’ (Schielke 2011). 
 The ‘outward’-oriented activity of occupation turned ‘inward’, transforming structures that 
had been developed as external weapons against the state into internal means of self-
governance. Revolutionary collaboration created, on the one hand, its own division of labour, 
leaders, rules, relations, material tools, and signs; and, on the other, it appropriated existing 
traditions such as the Ultras’ movement and the religious mulid as organizational means for 
political protest. Established artists joined the protests, and amateur cartoonists, actors, and 
singers emerged from the activity of Tahrir itself. Art often functioned as a shortcut that 
elucidated, disclosed, or unpacked complex political and economic narratives: ‘This poetry is 
not an ornament to the uprising—it is its soundtrack and also composes a significant part of 
the action itself’ (Colla 2012, 77). The art of the Square became its material self-
consciousness. 
 As the state was forcefully driven away, practices of self-governing emerged from the 
developed collaboration of occupation: Daily struggles to hold the space and feed its 
inhabitants, without the disciplined mechanisms of an organized state, were exercised in 
democratic process. It was through these everyday practices that Tahrir became a truly radical 
space” (Shokr 2012, 44). British actor Khaled Abdallah, who was among the protesters in 
Tahrir, declared that Tahrir ‘has now become like a mini state that works and will function as 
long as it needs to in order to get what this country deserves’ (Guardian News Blog 6/2, 
2011). Thus the ‘freed zone’ was increasingly dubbed the ‘Republic of Tahrir’ by participants 
and observers alike (see Khalil 2012). The Square needed directive organs and practices of 
deliberation and decision. Activists who had been a part of the political community before the 
revolution, and leaders who materialized spontaneously within the ranks of protesters, tried to 
give direction to the amorphous movement. Political activists intervened in the movement 
with pamphlets and slogans, convincing protesters to stay in Tahrir when Mubarak pledged to 
fire the cabinet, putting forward concrete demands, and recommending instruments and 
methods to achieve the popular objectives.    
 Already on the first Friday of Anger, 28 January, there were activists who tried to rally and 
direct people towards occupying not only the largely symbolic location of Tahrir, but also 
‘real’ spaces of state power. Friday 5 February was dubbed Friday of Departure as an 
ultimatum to Mubarak. During the Friday of Departure there was a renewed attempt to orient 
the masses towards a march on the presidential palace, but this call did not materialise. 
Conversely, the regime, after its disastrous attempts to repress the revolutionary uprising by 
force, was content to wage a war of attrition with the occupiers. This episode expressed both 
the strength and the weakness of the revolutionary project at that moment. Whereas the 
movement had been able to set its own concrete timetable and demands, it had not yet 
developed the means to enforce them. Protesters hoped that Mubarak would, like Ben Ali in 
Tunisia, just leave in the face of their mass protests. State institutions were paralysed and 
disorganised due to the demonstrations and sit-ins, but they were not captured and 
transformed. As long as the main institutions, such as the Maspero television and radio 
building, parliament, the presidential palace, and army barracks, were protected by the 
military, the state dug in, enduring the protests in the hope that the demonstrators’ physical 
and mental constitution would wear down quickly. Whereas occupation had had been the 
motor of the uprising in the previous week, it now became a bottleneck for its further 
development. 
 From Tuesday 8 February onward some participants tried to develop a ‘second front’ of 
occupation near the parliament and the presidential palace. Alexandria protesters sent a 
message to Tahrir that they should occupy the Maspero building (Schielke 2011). Tahrir had 
to negate itself. Its revolutionary governance had to be shared with neighbourhoods and 
workplaces all over Egypt. Instead of being just a particular within the revolution, the 
Republic of Tahrir had to become a universal connecting its vanguard role to the struggles 
waged by the popular masses outside its borders.  
 From the beginning of the uprising, there had been an exchange between Tahrir occupiers 
and protesters in other Cairo neighborhoods and provincial towns and cities. In the Square 
these ‘delegations’ enjoyed the freedom to debate the strategy of the movement and the future 
of Egypt. When they returned to their local site of protest they shared and diffused the 
experience of the Republic of Tahrir. However, these connections were anything but systemic 
and coherent. The expansion of Tahrir required a grassroots political centre and apparatus of 
some kind, that, in Leninist terms, would represent both the plurality and the concentrated will 
of the masses and showed ‘them the shortest and most direct route to complete, absolute and 
decisive victory’ (Lenin 1962, 113). 
 
Repossession of the Popular Subject 
The movement of the masses toward key sites of state power – in particular the presidential 
palace and the parliament– and the parallel explosion of nation-wide strikes, prompted the 
Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) to intervene in the revolutionary process, cutting 
short the development of popular self-mediations. Taking the lead in the revolutionary process 
seemed to agree with the dominant sentiment among protesters that SCAF was on their side. 
Conversely, the generals were pressured to act because the interpellation of ‘the people and 
the army: one hand’ started to affect the rank and file soldiers. Once Mubarak had been 
removed by SCAF, the regime was no longer immediately represented in a concentrated form 
and its attributes – corruption, violence, authoritarianism, poverty, and so on – became 
disembodied and abstracted. The concretisation of al-nizam in thought required a thorough 
critique of Egypt’s economic structure and relations of domination and hegemony – a critique 
that would unmask the interests of the military, the Brotherhood, and other forces that claimed 
popular leadership in the ensuing struggle for power.  
 Nevertheless, the absence of a grassroots political centre allowed the military leaders to 
step in and represent themselves as revolutionary arbiters or even leaders, restoring the logic 
of external representation. The masses confused military coup for revolutionary leadership, 
and the great majority returned back to their homes (see Khalil 2012, 266). A small group of 
occupiers argued that they should remain in Tahrir in order to pressure the SCAF for real 
reforms. After March, Tahrir still welcomed tens of thousands of protesters and occupiers, for 
example during the Friday of Cleaning on 8 April 2011, the second Friday of Anger on 27 
May 2011, throughout July, the Friday of Correcting the Path on 9 September 2011, and at the 
eve of the 2011 parliamentary and 2012 presidential elections. Those protesting became 
increasingly disappointed with the lack of real change and the counterrevolutionary role of the 
SCAF. 
 The failure to expand the Republic of Tahrir to the whole of Egypt reduced the Square to a 
symbolic site for ritualistic protest and a tourist site of commemoration of the revolutionary 
uprising where t-shirts and souvenirs were sold – already celebrating the past of the revolt 
instead of its presence or future (Gribbon and Hawas 2012, 135). Whereas the Republic of 
Tahrir had appropriated the organisational traditions of the carnivalesque mulid during the 18 
Days, now the revolutionary activity of the Square had been turned into a largely harmless 
festival. 
 People often expressed their confidence in their own collective agency to keep SCAF in 
check and claimed that they knew now that they could and would return to the streets when 
something did not work out as they wanted it to be. Such statements highlighted a general rise 
in political consciousness and subjectness that the uprising had stimulated. Although the 
SCAF governed, it was ‘the people’ that had given the military a provisional mandate. At the 
same time, without real structures that organised and concentrated popular power, this 
revolutionary awareness became difficult to mobilise. Moreover, the separation of political 
consciousness from everyday practices of mass protest increasingly emptied the national-
popular subject of its material content. The moment of general insurrection was dissolved 
back into constituent parts. The past and present of the revolution were rewritten by those in 
power: some revolutionary actors were excluded from al- sha‘b, such as striking workers, 
while other, counterrevolutionary, forces were included (Sallam 2011b), hiding, sometimes 
literally, behind the Egyptian flag. Mobinil and Vodaphone set up giant billboards in the 
national colors with the slogan ‘We are all Egyptians’; and shops like Adidas painted their 
windows as Egyptian flags in order to prevent people from smashing them. Popular 
sovereignty was disconnected from the activity of protest and became a floating signifier, 
which could be easily appropriated by the political forces involved in the post-Mubarak 
hegemonic struggle. 
 The continuation of workplace strikes and street demonstrations ‘from below’ – the now 
dispersed body of popular sovereignty – stood in stark contrast to the normalisation and 
consolidation of political society ‘from above’, spearheaded by SCAF and supported by al-
Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood) and the Salafists. The military coup gave way to 
a civil counterrevolution that took on the form of military-supervised representative politics. 
Instead of representing a genuine process of revolutionary democratic change, elections and 
referenda were deployed by the ‘transition government’ as weapons of restoration. Firstly, 
they narrowed the meaning and space of ‘revolutionary politics’ from spontaneous street and 
workplace protests to the limited and top-down controlled domain of the state. Secondly, 
elections and formal democratic procedures atomized the volonté générale into the volonté 
des tous: the ‘qualitative’ majority in the streets was reduced to a ‘quantitative’ minority in 
the polling booths. Active protesters faced the inert force of the ‘silent majority’ that had 
stayed at home throughout the 18 Days and had not gone through the transformative 
experience of revolution. Thirdly, by controlling the pace of elections and the agenda of 
referenda, the regime was able to create new cleavages within the popular subject – especially 
the sectarian divide between ‘secularists’ and ‘Islamists’.  
 In the second round of the 2012 presidential elections, Egyptians were forced to choose 
between the lesser of two evils: the Ikhwan candidate Mohammed Morsi and SCAF’s 
candidate Ahmed Shafiq. The victory of Morsi was as much a setback for the military as an 
opportunity to share the burden of ruling with a civil ally. Morsi catapulted Brotherhood 
sympathizer Abdul Fattah al-Sisi into the position of defense minister and chief of staff of the 
armed forces (Springborg 2012). The constitution of 26 December 2012, which shielded the 
defense budget from parliamentary oversight and asserted that the minister of defense was 
chosen from the ranks of the military, affirmed the alliance between the Ikhwan and the 
military elites (De Smet 2014a). 
 After initial enthusiasm about Egypt’s first ‘democratically elected’, civil president, in the 
fall of 2012 there was a growing discontent among broad layers of the population with the 
Brotherhood’s inability or unwillingness to forge a national consensus, to dismantle and 
democratise state structures such as the interior ministry, to solve the economic crisis, and so 
on. Morsi’s constitutional declaration on 22 November 2012, which temporarily granted him 
absolute executive and legislative powers, seemed to confirm the worst fears among secular 
opposition forces about a ‘Brotherhoodisation’ of political and civil society.  
 In 2011 and 2012 SCAF had tried, unsuccessfully, to destroy the popular subjectivity of 
revolt by demobilizing the masses and calling for ‘order’ and ‘stability’. Now, with increasing 
discontent against Morsi’s presidency, the popular body of protest was appropriated by the 
military and security apparatus and most of their liberal, nationalist, and socialist allies as a 
battering ram against the Brotherhood. The next few months saw an escalation of violent mass 
protests between pro-Morsi and anti-Brotherhood demonstrators. While both camps claimed 
to represent the revolutionary path, they contained a mix of revolutionary and 
counterrevolutionary forces subsumed by two factions of the counterrevolution. Without the 
will or ability to mobilize an independent social base against the Islamists, secular parties 
could not but look for protection among the armed forces and the old security apparatus 
against the bigger ‘threat’ of Islamism. 
 At the end of April 2013 the petition campaign Tamarud (Rebel) was established, which 
collected signatures calling on president Morsi to step down. Although infiltrated by anti-
Morsi elements of the security apparatus (al-Sharif and Saleh 2013), it became a huge mass 
movement, which gathered numbers in the streets that were only comparable to those of the 
January 25 uprising. After collecting millions of signatures from ordinary Egyptians, Tamarud 
launched the 30 June Front to organize protests against the president on the day that 
commemorated his first year in power. On 28 and 29 June preparatory demonstrations turned 
violent when they clashed with pro-Morsi supporters. Massive demonstrations and strikes 
mobilising millions of Egyptians in the streets erupted on 30 June, demanding nothing less 
than the resignation of the president. After two more days of deadly clashes between pro and 
anti-Morsi protesters, the 30 June Front met with the military leaders, and shortly thereafter 
Sisi declared that the president had been removed from his position and that chief Justice Adli 
Mansour would head a transitional government as interim president. Morsi was arrested and 
the army occupied key political and economic sites in the country, cheered by the anti-Morsi 
masses. Mirroring February 2011, a popular uprising was ‘crowned’ with a military coup. 
 Before 2013 the revolutionary process had been marred by violent episodes, often pitting 
revolutionary protesters against the state apparatus. The clash between Brotherhood 
supporters and opposition forces brought violence into the ranks of the revolutionaries 
themselves. Moreover, after the 2013 coup violence became endemic to mass mobilisation, 
acquiring an anti-emancipatory logic of its own. Sisi was able to ground popular consent in 
the state’s violent coercion – often even physical liquidation – of the Ikhwan. His hegemony 
was not rooted in the masses’ utopian desire for liberation from oppression, but in their 
dystopian drives of fear and uncertainty, which were channeled into an authoritarian project 
of hysterical hyper-nationalism that revolved around the repression of the ‘enemy within’. 
The combination of a violent popular social body in the streets and a state-driven, hyper-
nationalist project of restoration indicated a movement toward the opposite of self-directing 
popular sovereignty: a Fascistic regime in which popular subjectivity and subjectness were 
increasingly represented by an authoritarian state and its celebrated leader. The word al- sha‘b  
lost its poetic revolutionary resonance as the opposition between people and state was 
resolved by absorbing the former into the latter (see Attaleh in Seikaly et al. 2015). Media 
spoke increasingly about ‘Egyptians’ instead of ‘the people’ (Elsadda in Seikaly et al. 2015), 
which indicated the re-atomisation of the popular subject. As a material force, the mass social 
body that expressed the sovereignty of the people had disappeared from the streets, the 
workplaces, and the neighborhoods. However, it continued to exist among activists and the 
wider population as an active or dormant subjectivity, of which the position and meaning 
within the individual identity was determined by their rational and emotional experience and 
interpretation – hope, fear, disappointment – of the course of the revolutionary process. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued for a constructivist understanding of popular identities through a 
discussion of subject formation in the Egyptian 25 January revolution. The collective agent 
that exercised its will at Tahrir was neither a homogeneous, fixed population waiting behind 
the curtains of history to make its sudden appearance, nor a loose collection of individuals or 
groups that were lumped together under the generic term of ‘the people’. The nature, 
dynamic, and outcome of the revolutionary process cannot be deduced solely from a 
sociological survey or ethnography of preexisting individual or group-based popular 
identities, which somehow fused together during the 18 Days. By taking the movement itself, 
the purposeful activity or project of the participants, as our unit of analysis, our attention 
shifts to the process of transformation and construction of these identities. Through the 
struggle of the 18 Days, the occupation of Tahrir, and the development of structures of self-
representation, existing but fragmented popular subjectivities were connected to a general but 
abstract notion of sovereignty and transformed into forms of collective agency. A subject and 
activity-centered approach recognizes the autonomous movement and irreducible character of 
this collective agency once it has established itself.  
 People participating in the revolutionary protests were exposed to new forms of living, 
thinking, and expressing themselves – a new subjectivity – which temporarily or permanently 
altered their identity. Apart from the truism that identities are fluid and composite in nature 
this experience illustrates that revolutions are not made by revolutionary people, but that 
revolutionary people are made by revolutions. It also underlines that ‘popular identity’ 
remains a politically ambiguous signifier, which can be easily appropriated by authoritarian 
interpretations, unless it is connected to a real emancipatory mass movement, which fills the 
category with a practical content. 
 Some interpretations have blamed the concept of ‘the people’ itself for Egypt’s current 
descent into violence, exclusion, and nationalist authoritarianism for the premise of popular 
unity precludes diversity and minority positions (Gerbaudo 2014). However, the 18 Days 
illustrated that ‘the people’, as a collective actor, can be both united and diverse, and that it 
can articulate a ‘general will’ that is inclusive and respectful of internal differences. The real 
challenge to emancipation is not a unitary concept of ‘the people’, but the mediation of 
popular sovereignty by an external, authoritarian force.  
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i This chapter builds on previous research and publications (e.g. De Smet 2014a, 2014b), but especially on 
my monograph A Dialectical Pedagogy of Revolt. Gramsci, Vygotsky, and the 25 January Revolution (2015, 
Leiden: Brill).  
ii A fourteen-story modernist style administrative building that dominates Tahrir Square, built in the 
1940s. 
iii Activist is deployed here in its broad, common sense meaning of people dedicating time, energy, and 
other resources to a project that transcends their immediate interests. 
iv A popular and military uprising in Egypt from 1879 to 1882 led by Colonel Ahmed ‘Urabi against 
Khedive Tawfiq Pasha and British and French dominion, which could be interpreted as the first modern 
nationalist mass movement. 
